INTRODUCTION
In 2007-2009 the United States faced a severe financial crisis that resulted in the worst downturn in output and employment since the Great Depression. Economists and policy makers have concentrated on understanding the fundamental causes of this crisis and how to end it. In addition, the dramatic collapse in world trade that was both triggered by the crisis and helped spread it has led to new work on the linkages between financial distress and global trade flows.
A topic that has received less attention is how East-West global imbalances-particularly those of China and the United States--have changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis. That is the focus of this paper.
In the run-up to the financial crisis, the world economy was characterized by enormous current-account imbalances (Figure 1 ). China's surplus alone was 0.7% of world GDP in 2008 while the United States had a deficit of more than 1% of world GDP that year. The currentaccount balances of the world's surplus countries (e.g., China, Germany, Japan, oil exporters) exceeded 2.5% of global GDP in 2008; the current-account balances of the world's deficit countries (e.g., the United States, non-Asian emerging markets, the Euro area excluding Germany) also were about 2.5% of global GDP.
Prior to the financial crisis, some suggested large imbalances could be sustained for the foreseeable future. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003, 2005) , for example, argued an Asian periphery, primarily China, could pursue a development strategy of export-led growth supported by undervalued exchange rates and capital controls for many years. Large currentaccount surpluses and official capital outflows in the form of accumulated reserve asset claims on the United States would characterize the Asian periphery for perhaps a decade or more.
Moreover, the strategy was a "win" for the center (e.g., the United States) as well, since virtually unlimited demand for its financial assets would allow it to run large current-account deficits, living beyond its means for years. 2 At some point, the Asian periphery would grow sufficiently to graduate to the center. It would then undertake financial liberalization and adopt greater exchange-rate flexibility. But when that happened, another set of developing countries would step forward to become the new periphery, pursuing the same export-led growth strategy against the center as had China and the Asian periphery, and before them, post-war Europe and Japan. As a result, global imbalances, with the periphery running large current-account surpluses and the center large current-account deficits, would be a regular feature of the international monetary system for years to come.
In later work, Dooley et al (2004) provided an asset-market interpretation of the win-win view of global imbalances. The interpretation went as follows. U.S. deficits supplied international collateral to poorer countries on the periphery eager to undertake capital formation; the collateral freed them from a reliance on inefficient domestic financial markets. FDI flows into China provided supporting evidence for this claim. The modern mercantilist view, embraced by Lee (2007, 2008) and others, provided a less sanguine interpretation for the persistent global imbalances that emerged in the 2000s. While Aizenman and Lee confirmed the hoarding of international reserves that accompanied current-account surpluses was dominated by a precautionary motive prior to 2000, a finding consistent with Marion's (2003, 2004) earlier interpretations, there appeared to be a regime change afterwards. 2 China's international reserves that had been trendless during the second half of the 1990s, hovering around 15% of GDP, grew after 2000 at an annual rate of about 4%, reaching almost 45% of GDP by 2007 ( Figure 2 ).
1 Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) , Ju and Wei (2010) and others explored this interpretation in models with FDI and global imbalances.
3 Aizenman and Lee (2008) pointed to monetary mercantilism as the main reason for the regime change. Like earlier mercantilist efforts to expand export markets and accumulate gold described by Adam Smith (1776) , after the year 2000 countries such as China started pushing exports to promote growth, racking up current-account surpluses and growing stockpiles of international reserves. The numbers were impressive. On the eve of the financial crisis, China's real GDP growth had reached 14% (Figure 3 ), its current-account surplus had grown to 10% of GDP (Figure 4) , and its international reserves had reached almost 45% of GDP prior to the crisis, peaking at about 50% in 2010 (Figure 2 ). However, unlike Dooley et al's (2003 Dooley et al's ( , 2004 Dooley et al's ( , 2005 win-win view of global imbalances buffered by international reserve hoarding, Aizenman and Lee (2008) warned that modern mercantilism could lead to unintended adverse consequences such as competitive hoarding.
The view that large East-West global imbalances could be sustained for a long period was not shared by everyone. Eichengreen (2007) and Feldstein (2008) , for example, argued the Asian periphery was not monolithic; some member of the periphery might abandon fixed exchange rates against the dollar sooner than later, either willingly or in response to speculative pressures, thereby reducing East-West global imbalances. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) also saw large imbalances as unsustainable and worried whether they would unwind gradually or abruptly. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2011) observed that global imbalances where poorer countries financed richer ones were driven mainly by government decisions and official capital flows, since private funds tended to move in the opposite direction, attracted by higher growth rates in poorer countries. They raised concerns about the global efficiency and sustainability of these trends. Aizenman and Sun (2010) also raised doubts that large global imbalances could be sustainable. They argued that with China growing at twice the rate of the United States, the U.S.
current-account deficits needed to absorb China's surpluses in coming years --in the absence of other big countries willing to run large deficits --would be unrealistically high and hence selflimiting in the not too distant future.
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Then the financial crisis hit. In the U.S., the private sector was forced to deleverage and reduced its demand for imports. Other crisis-hit developed countries also cut back on imports.
As China experienced weaker export demand, it took seriously the IMF's call for more reliance on domestic spending to sustain growth. It began promoting greater domestic consumption and investment with the help of a domestic credit boom. It also pursued fiscal stimulus and allowed its real exchange rate to appreciate. It attempted to diversify its holdings of dollar-denominated reserve assets by creating a sovereign wealth fund and encouraging outward foreign direct (Table   1b) . According to the IMF, China's current-account surplus is expected to be 0.32% of world GDP at the end of 2013.
Before the financial crisis, the U.S. current-account deficit was about 6% of U.S. GDP in both 2005 and 2006 and 5% in 2007 . After the onset of the financial crisis it fell to 2.7% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2012. As a share of global GDP, the U.S. current-account deficit also fell dramatically. The IMF expects it to be at a sixteen-year low of 0.64% by the end of 2013.
Standard macroeconomic models can easily account for the reduction in global imbalances in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis. Financial frictions and household deleveraging reduce import demand as well as aggregate demand in crisis-hit countries, reducing their current-account deficits. The decline or reversal in international financial inflows during a financial crisis also depreciates their real exchange rates, further reducing their deficits. If weak demand impacts many countries, there are few to take up the slack. Countries with large currentaccount surpluses, such as China, will see demand collapse for their exports and will experience declining current-account surpluses. Policies that stimulate domestic demand to make up for the export shortfall can reduce current-account surpluses even more.
In this paper, we look at the data and move directly to an empirical investigation. We explore panel regressions as a way to highlight important correlations between current-account balances and economic variables both before and after the financial crisis. Although data are only available for six years since the onset of the financial crisis, the regression estimates provide some suggestive evidence on whether the crisis will have a long-lasting impact on moderating current-account imbalances, particularly those of China and the United States.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our estimation procedure. We restrict the sample to countries with annual observations in each of two sub-periods, one before the financial crisis and the other after its onset. The sample is further restricted by data availability. Our final sample contains 95 countries; 30 of these countries are OECD members.
The estimation draws on the empirical framework in Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Gruber and Kamin (2007) . The estimating equation is:
where CAY it is the current-account balance as a percentage of GDP of country i at time t, X it-1 is a vector of lagged economic variables, C i = {c 1 ,….c 94 } is a vector of country fixed effects, and DEMAND USA,t-1 is the lagged U.S. current-account balance as a share of GDP. The economic factors included in X are economic performance, captured by the growth rate of real GDP and real GDP per capita; structure, represented by openness to trade and the share of natural resources exports in GDP; external wealth, measured by international reserves as a share of GDP; debt, measured by the stock of public debt as a share of GDP; and the real exchange rate.
8 exports of China and other countries, enabling them to run big current-account surpluses over part of the sample period.
The Appendix provides a table of summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation.
BASELINE RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Before proceeding with the formal estimation, we first test for possible non-stationarity. For each variable, we perform panel data unit-root tests using a Fisher-type (Choi, 2001 ) procedure, including one lag in the test. The test is not limited to a balanced sample and has a null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root. Based on the test results, non-stationary variables are then first-differenced. The correlation between the current-account surplus and an increase in international reserves is always positive and significant.
The correlation between the current-account surplus and an increase in U.S. demand is positive and significant for the full sample period and pre-crisis period. The correlation is 9 insignificant post-crisis. The latter result suggests a possible structural change in the role of the U.S. as the demander of last resort following the financial crisis.
The correlation between the current-account surplus and real GDP growth is always negative and significant; the same is true of the correlation between the current-account surplus and the increase in public debt.
The correlation between the current-account surplus and trade is positive and significant for the full sample period and pre-crisis period but negative and significant post-crisis.
The correlation between the current-account surplus and appreciation of the real exchange rate is negative and significant for the full sample period but insignificant in each of the two sub-periods.
The correlation results for trade and the real exchange rate are consistent with the complementary relationship between the surplus countries and the U.S. prior to the financial crisis and its reversal after the crisis. Prior to the crisis, the relatively high rates of employment and low rates of unemployment in the U.S. as well as the presumption that The Great
Moderation was the new normal put to rest most concerns about increasing global imbalances.
Moreover, large and growing U.S. current-account deficits translated into large and growing world demand for U.S. assets that helped keep U.S. interest rates low and allowed the U.S. to access global savings when its own saving rate was low. These trends were complemented by the growing exports and current-account surpluses of China and other emerging markets as they pursued export-led growth strategies.
The financial crisis forced countries to confront a changed global picture, with much slower growth in the OECD countries and reduced demand for the exports of emerging markets that had previously relied on export-led growth strategies. In the post-crisis environment, depreciating currencies and hoarding international reserves are not enough to sustain robust 10 export-led growth. The estimates in Table 2a confirm that a structural change has taken place post-crisis. An F-test rejects the null of no structural change between the pre-crisis period ) and the post-crisis period (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) .
To explore further possible differences between the pre-and post-crisis periods, we reestimate the regression over the entire sample period, now including a dummy variable equal to one for the post-crisis years 2007-2012 plus interactive terms. The results are reported in Table   2b . The F-test confirms that the null of no structural change between the pre-crisis and postcrisis periods can be rejected with high confidence.
Several results in Table 2b The correlation between the current-account surplus and U.S. demand in the pre-crisis period ( pre-crisis is positive and highly significant. The positive correlation is much weaker in the post-crisis period ( post-crisis pre-crisis interaction although an F-test reveals it is still significant (F=8.52, Prob>F=0.0036). After the onset of the financial crisis, the United States no longer plays such an important role as 'demander of last resort" for the exports of other countries. Its private and public sectors have had to undergo substantial adjustments, making them less able to absorb the world's exports. The U.S. private sector has had to deleverage in response to the negative wealth effects of declining real estate and portfolio valuations. The more limited access of households to the credit market has raised private savings.
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The U.S. public sector has contracted in response to the end of the federal fiscal stimulus, the drop of public investment and spending, and the negative stimulus stemming from declining tax revenues and mounting debts in the fifty U.S. states. These private and public sector adjustments post-crisis have required the U.S. to retreat from its role as "demander of last resort" for the world's exports. Table 3a reports results for the current accounts of surplus and non-surplus countries in the pre-and post-crisis periods. A surplus country is defined as one having a current-account surplus greater than 1.5 percent of GDP in a given year and having experienced an increasing surplus in the prior two years. The current accounts of surplus countries are significantly correlated with fewer economic variables than the full sample of countries, and even these significant correlations do not generally carry over to the post-crisis period. Prior to the financial crisis, the current accounts of surplus countries are positively and significantly associated with the increase in international reserves, trade, and the increase in the US current-account deficit.
After the financial crisis, the first two correlations are insignificant and the correlation with U.S. demand reverses sign; it is now negative and significant. An F-test rejects the null of no structural break for surplus countries after the onset of the financial crisis.
An F-test also rejects the null of no structural break across the two periods for nonsurplus countries. A number of correlations that are highly significant prior to the crisis lose their significance in the post-crisis period. The role of the U.S. as a "demander of last resort,"
for example, loses its significance after 2006.
To explore further the possible differences between the pre-and post-crisis periods for the two country groupings, we estimate separate regressions for the surplus and non-surplus countries, using the full sample period and including the time dummy and its interactions. The 12 results are reported in Table 3b . F-tests reject the null of no structural break post-crisis for both the surplus and non-surplus countries.
The role of the U.S. as a demander of last resort is not an important factor either before or after the crisis for non-surplus countries. For the surplus countries, it is a significant factor in each period. 7 Interestingly, the U.S. role as demander of last resort is significantly different after the onset of the crisis for surplus countries.
The correlation between the current-account surplus and increase in international reserves is positive and significant for both surplus and non-surplus countries prior to the crisis. After the crisis, there is no significant change in the correlation for non-surplus countries. For the countries in surplus, however, the correlation is significantly dampened after the crisis, although an F-test shows that it remains positive and significant. Table 2a .
The pre-crisis forecast predicts a declining current account/GDP surplus for China after
2008. This prediction is in line with the realized decrease in China's current-account surplus,
7 An F-test reveals that the correlation in the post-crisis period is significant; F=9.80, Prob>F=0.0022.
8 In one version we added the growth of domestic credit as a share of GDP as a regressor and interacted it with the time dummy. Including the domestic credit variable reduces the country sample from 95 to 83. The correlation of the current-account surplus and the growth of domestic credit is positive and significant in the pre-crisis period only for the non-surplus countries and the correlation in the post-crisis period is not significantly different from the one in the pre-crisis period. Finally, we examine the changes in China's international reserves over the last thirtythree years ( Figure 5 and 7) . We quantify the sources of these changes. This exercise allows us to trace the changing impact of inward and outward FDI on international reserves, as well as the influence of the trade balance, domestic credit, and real exchange-rate appreciation. As there is no reason for the relationship between reserves and these factors to be stable over time, we examine separately the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Table 4 We summarize the sources of changes in China's international reserves in Figure 9 . This figure plots the economic significance of a one-standard-deviation increase in the source variable on the change in China's international reserves as a percent of its GDP. The calculation is based on the regression reported in Table 4 , Column VII. The figure reveals the role of China's trade 14 balance on its international reserves has been remarkably symmetric in the pre-and post-crisis periods, highlighting the common impact of the financial crisis on China's current account and international reserves. Domestic credit also plays much the same role as a source of change in the pre-and post-crisis periods. The same cannot be said for FDI. Outward FDI played no significant role prior to the crisis but it has become an important source of change in China's international reserves after the crisis.
To put these results in a broader perspective, it is worth nothing that in 2012, domestic investment in China reached almost 50 percent of GDP and domestic credit grew to about 200 percent of GDP. In addition, China's saving rate is probably well above the 'Golden Rule' rate. 
CONCLUSION
Panel regressions show that standard variables adopted by the literature, measures capturing economic performance, economic structure, external wealth, debt, and the exchange rate, are helpful in "explaining" the current-account behavior of almost 100 countries over the period 1983-2012. The role of the United States in sustaining current-account surpluses elsewhere by running its own sizeable deficits has obviously diminished after the onset of the financial crisis.
The role of the financial crisis in reducing global imbalances is also evident. Moreover, there is some evidence that the financial crisis --and the impact it has had on both economic indicators and policy actions --has brought about a structural change in the relationship between current accounts and these economic factors.
The rebalancing of current accounts in both China and the United States post-crisis will likely change the pattern of international reserve hoarding. While the precautionary motive for hoarding international reserves is consistent with China holding a sizeable international reserve stockpile, it does not support the optimally of holding reserves in the form of low-yielding U.S.
government debt at levels of 40 to 50 percent of GDP (Jeanne, 2007) . Arguably, Dooley et al. Intriguingly, the success of Chinese export-led growth strategy probably propagated the headwinds leading to its possible demise, as there is limited tolerance for its continuation at a time of falling employment rates and growth rates in the OECD and at a time when China's GDP has grown to about half the size of the U.S. economy (in current US$).
Hoarding reserves may delay the real appreciation associated with successful export-led growth, but the inevitable appreciation of China's currency will depress even further the real return on dollar-denominated assets held as international reserves. A more balanced strategy calls for diversifying out of liquid U.S. government bonds and into less liquid but (ex-ante)
higher-yielding real foreign assets. That diversification can take place through greater outward FDI that, in turn, mitigates reserve hoarding. Indeed, as Figure 7 illustrates, this diversification has already begun. 
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